


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21 May 1985



USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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21 May 1985

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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WARSAW PACT

OFFICERS IDENTIFIED: NGSF

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 30 January 1985 carries on page 2 a 200-word article by Major N. Kikeshev entitled "Komsomol Conferences" which reports on a Komsomol conference in the Northern Group of Soviet Forces in Poland. The article identifies Colonel General A. Kovtunov as commander in chief of the Northern Group of Forces. It also lists Major General I. Titov as the chief of the Group's Political Administration.

OFFICER IDENTIFICATION: SGSF

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 8 February 1985 carries on page 2 a 200-word unattributed article entitled "Bitter Lessons," which identifies Major General R. Beshchev as the first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Southern Group of Forces.

CSO: 1801/176

ARMED FORCES

CZECH DEFENSE MINISTER VISITS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 85 p 1

[Article: "On the Visit to the Soviet Union by Col Gen Milan Vaclavik, Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic"]

[Text] CSSR Minister of National Defense Col Gen M. Vaclavik arrives in Moscow today on an official friendly visit at the invitation of USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU S. L. Sokolov.

Col Gen M. Vaclavik was born on 31 March 1928 to the family of a railroad worker. Before being called up for military service he worked as a fitter at the Povazska Machine Building Combine in the city of Povazska Bystrica.

He was called up into the Czechoslovak People's Army in 1949. He has a higher military education and completed the Frunze Military Academy and USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy in the USSR. He has held a number of command and staff positions in units, large units and formations of the ChNA [Czechoslovak People's Army].

He was appointed first deputy chief of the Czechoslovak People's Army General Staff in 1983 and has been CSSR Minister of National Defense since January 1985.

Servicemen of the USSR Armed Forces as well as all Soviet citizens welcome CSSR Minister of National Defense Col Gen Vaclavik and his party and express confidence that this visit will serve the cause of further development and strengthening of the indestructible fraternal friendship and comprehensive cooperation between the peoples and armies of the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

6904
CSO: 1800/185

ARMED FORCES

INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COORDINATED SUBUNIT TRAINING

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Col I. Smalyuk, Order of Lenin Transbaikal Military District: "The Commander and Modern Combat: The Teamwork of Teams"]

[Text] This happened in a tactical exercise. A signal about the approach of "enemy" aircraft arrived at the command post and the mission for repelling the attack was assigned to the surface-to-air missile [SAM] battalion in which Maj V. Kozlovskiy was performing the duties of launcher control officer.

Then the first target blip was on the screen. It riveted the launcher control officer's attention so much that he didn't notice the appearance of other targets. The intercept controller had reported on them several minutes earlier but at that time the launcher control officer himself was informing the higher command post about something. When he took another look at the screen he saw that there was no longer one, but several targets in dangerous proximity to the defended site. What should he do? In such a situation one doesn't grasp things all at once, and additionally there was the babel of subordinates' reports, mostly insignificant. Finally the launcher control officer made a decision and work entered a normal rhythm, but soon a new hitch arose because of the lack of coordination between operators and the intercept controller. Then there was more trouble... As a result, the SAM system's fire capabilities were ineffectively used.

What was the reason? Why did those same soldiers who the day before had answered the inspectors so sharply on theory and confidently demonstrated their ability to service the equipment prove not to be up to it in the exercise? An analysis of the battalion's combat training showed that preference had been given to individual training here for many months. The commander believed that a high state of training of the individual specialist in itself would assure teamwork of the teams and the battalion as a whole. Several full-scale practices also seemed to confirm the supposition, but as it now was learned, the practices had been held at that time under a very oversimplified format. The missilemen only had to be faced with a real test, and the methods errors immediately made themselves known.

The teamwork of a crew or team in the servicing and tactical employment of crew-served weapons always has been and still is one of the most important factors in attaining victory. It helped Soviet soldiers out more than once

during the Great Patriotic War. It is understandable that the teamwork of teams acquires special significance under the conditions of modern warfare with its intense, dynamic and fast-moving nature. It stands to reason that in speaking about problems of developing the personnel's collective professional skills, we cannot underestimate individual training. We can't get by without it, for example, in the initial phase of specialist training, but it is at this time that foremost commanders strive to accustom the soldier to think and act not only within the restricted space of his work station, but also at the team and subunit level. As experience confirms, classes in which trainees experience ever-increasing mental, physical and psychological stresses contribute to the teamwork of teams.

...After appearing only for an instant, the target blips on the screen were immediately lost in interference. But this time was enough for operators privates A. Zhitnikov and B. Kozhin to give the launcher control officer and intercept controller the aircraft characteristics. Launcher control officer Capt Yu. Gvanovskiy immediately determined that the primary feature of the action was not the jamming (by the way, the operators already had switched on antijam equipment without awaiting his instructions). It was obvious that the "enemy" was counting on the minimal time interval of the aircraft's entry into the impact zone. Were the missilemen to allow the slightest delay in transferring fire to the targets they could consider the fight lost. The launcher control officer explained the situation to subordinates concisely. The operators quickly adjusted the set for the necessary mode. There was mutual understanding (with half a word or half a gesture) between them and the intercept controller Sr Lt A. Voropayev. As soon as the first target was conditionally destroyed the operators instantaneously switched the gear to track a new target. There was another launch and again it was accurate.

The inspector later would say of Gvanovskiy's subordinates that they functioned competently, cohesively and without a fuss, and he would add that he sensed a good system of team training.

Capt Gvanovskiy believes that a thoughtful breakdown of efforts and time is needed both for individual specialist training and for teamwork training of the teams. This is reflected in combat training plans. Initially the commanders help young specialists master functional duties firmly, but it is then that they explain each soldier's role in tactical employment of the SAM system. The thought is stressed that a soldier doesn't perform his functions mechanically, but controls the formidable weapon actively together with comrades. Then come practices for teamwork as part of the teams and the subunit. Contests are organized for best specialist and best team, and finally the time comes for full-scale practices, which are dynamic, strenuous and instructive.

On entering practice combat in response to a sudden signal, the missilemen don't know what kind of targets--real or simulated--they are to work against, or from what direction and at what strength the means of attack will appear. Data on the "enemy" are clarified and updated during operational training work, and the commanders make decisions in accordance with the data.

The following point also is instructive. Data on a control target come in during a practice. The commanders as well as all the personnel have a special

attitude toward such targets, for the higher command post is evaluating their actions. It is a matter of honor for the collective to promptly detect, lock onto and "shoot down" a target. It would appear to be justified here to use only work techniques which have been tested repeatedly and not take any sort of risk. Capt Gvanovskiy has his own point of view on this score. For example, he doesn't replace young specialists with more experienced ones in such cases. There is, of course, a certain amount of risk in this, but the commander isn't worried about instantaneous success. He reasons that where if not in such responsible practices do specialists forge genuine warrior qualities and become imbued and strengthened by collectivism and the desire to work in such a way as to justify the commander's trust and not let comrades down?

If the cohesive combat team can be compared with a good orchestra, the launcher control officer acts as its conductor. He is the principal figure in the subunit command post. There also are appropriate demands placed on his training. I will say frankly that the outcome of the exercise mentioned at the outset was predetermined to a certain extent, in addition to all else, by the poor training of launcher control officer Maj Kozlovskiy. The reason was the very same formalism and indulgences in training. Again, the subunit where Gvanovskiy serves handles this matter in a different way. The commander requires his deputies to create the most unexpected situations for the launcher control officer, the intercept controller and all other team members in classes and practices. The more difficult the narrative problems which the missilemen have to encounter, the higher is the commander's evaluation of the practice. Many subunit officers regularly act as launcher control officer on his instructions.

And something else of great importance is that the subunit strives for high teamwork not only with full-strength teams, but with teams at reduced strength as well. This is why each soldier has mastered one or more related specialties and each officer is able to perform not only his own duties, but also those one level higher. In short, the servicemen's training is done with consideration of the stern realities of modern combat.

Meanwhile, I recall an episode from the life of yet another subunit. The team was functioning excellently in a control practice, but then the inspector ordered battery commander Capt A. Barabanov to take the launcher control officer's place. It was believed that Barabanov had fully mastered the duties of launcher control officer, but hardly had interference appeared on the screen when Barabanov began to become nervous and to issue instructions which were not very well thought out. It was later learned that the conclusion about his training as a launcher control officer had been made by the battalion commander only on the basis of the fact that Barabanov had learned to assess the combat readiness of hardware.

It already has become customary to call a SAM system a crew-served weapon. Each team member must perform his functional duties in precise coordination with comrades to ensure that there are no failures in servicing or tactical employment of the system. The teamwork of the team is a guarantee of high effectiveness of missile fire. This reaches its perfection where the personnel's training approximates the conditions of real combat to the maximum and where the foremost methodology of training and indoctrinating soldiers is used imaginatively.

21 May 1985

ARMED FORCES

CRITIQUE OF DRAFTEE PHYSICAL TRAINING

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Mar 85 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Boyko: "A Writer's Reflections: Become Strong, Sons!"]

[Text] What is the Army like from the standpoint of a former draftee? I remember a letter sent to the newspaper: "Dear Mama, our first sergeant managed to do in two weeks what you were unable to achieve in 18 years!" The first-year soldier said it well! And after reading this, thoughts automatically come about the unconditional wake-up early in the morning, the mandatory physical exercise, the strict words "Yes, Sir!" and much, much more. Behind the routine of a soldier's service is the stern wisdom of the regulation with its basis being the grandeur of Suvorov's motto "Difficult in an exercise and easy in combat!"

At times one has occasion to hear a young person ask: "But is physical strength so important for the future soldier, for our Army is outfitted with powerful equipment? But knowledge--that's necessary."

Yes, knowledge (and firm, diverse knowledge at that) really is necessary, but a soldier's physical conditioning, that athletic preparation with which the young eighteen-year-old will come into the Army, is no less important than knowledge. If it is outstanding, that means the soldier will reach the peak of Army proficiency faster and will endure the hardships of service easier. And if the preparation is poor? Then the first sergeant or commander will be doing what the school and family were supposed to have done. It is their obligation!

The families of our readers often receive letters in which the unit command element thanks the parents for their sons' good upbringing. Letters aren't written about lackluster upbringing. Perhaps it really isn't worthwhile to write to parents about this. Why these belated complaints? But I would write about these deficiencies to the organizations from which the draftees arrived and to the military commissariats where they were drafted. The fact is, it is far from everywhere that proper emphasis is placed on the draftees' conditioning. It was not by chance that the 1981 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "A Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport" states: "The physical preparedness of a considerable portion of the populace still does not fully meet the demands placed on a person by modern production and duty in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces."

Three and a half years have passed since this decree was adopted. Changes for the better unquestionably have been seen, but there still also are many unresolved problems.

The principal one is the clearly deficient physical education in the school. When I talk with physical culture teachers about this I hear in response: "But what can we do? Our capabilities are very limited. Two physical culture lessons a week for a total of 78 hours a year can change little. But additional efforts being taken for draftees' physical training are of an optional nature and, most important, they are unsupervised. Where can reserves be found?"

Where indeed? Perhaps in the military instructors' work? Yes, there is a curriculum for a school course in basic military training. First of all, however, is it complete? And secondly, it is no secret that today one military instructor places more emphasis on drill exercises, another on firing, a third on historical examples and a fourth on drill training. It goes without saying that all this is necessary. If we think about it, however, all these very important requirements also can be successfully perfected during service, but a draftee's physical training and his readiness to join the difficult conditions of modern Army life without delay cannot be put off "for later." The military training instructor of course cannot and must not substitute for the physical culture teacher. But isn't it really his duty to take the kids on a "military" tour of many days, organize a crosscountry race over broken terrain and head up the "Zarnitsa" game popular in the schools?

Many physical hobbies somehow have disappeared imperceptibly from the lives of our young people. Remember the parachute towers, dynamometers and shooting galleries, which were an indispensable characteristic of all young people's places of leisure. Now you see them rarely, and that's a pity. But it is impossible to teach children to engage in physical culture constantly and on their own if, for example, we take the path of an automatic increase in the time for sports activities. In my view, the qualitative aspect of the matter must play the deciding role here, for the future soldier's training has to begin not in 1-2 years before call-up into the Armed Forces. We need a stable system of that physical training which would shape a clear understanding of one's civic duty--readiness to stand up for the Motherland's defense--in every pupil or PTU [vocational-technical school] student. Remember, as V. Mayakovskiy said: "Train your muscles, breathing and body for the benefit of military affairs." For the benefit!

To this end it is necessary that the entire routine of the school day be saturated with physical culture elements. This means we have to take advantage of every opportunity for the children's active movement and for accustoming them to the most accessible and effective sports.

We have to... "We aren't against it," the teachers repeated to me, "but there are no opportunities." That's not true! There are opportunities; what is lacking is initiative. Is it often, for example, that the noon recess turns into an interesting practice? And don't hundreds of school gymnasiums stand idle during time off from classes? I will tell about two schools as an example. The first of them is in the working settlement of Vozrozhdeniye on the edge of Saratov Oblast, and the other is in the center of the city of Orel.

In both cases I asked ninth-graders to do pull-ups on the horizontal bar. Absolutely everyone did 15 pull-ups in the settlement school, where horizontal bars were installed even in corridors and at different levels. The settlement school has its own biathlon firing range. Rayon military commissariat workers confirmed the excellent training of draftees from this school. But in Orel only one of them coped with the assignment for an "outstanding" grade--he pulled up 15 times. Others coped much less successfully with the exercise. There was a pupil among them who couldn't do even one pull-up. By the way, this was no accident. He had a "two" in physical culture in the spring but did nothing over the summer to make up for lost time. And here is what especially puts one on guard in this matter: the failing pupil was the son of a serviceman. This fact somehow is hard to grasp: that an experienced officer is indifferent to his boy's physical conditioning. What can be demanded of the others in this case?

Of course, there also are other examples. One often has occasion to see upperclassmen both in city and rural schools demonstrate superb physical training: they have mastered the entire set of skills which will be extremely necessary to them during Army service. Nevertheless, the existing contrasts must force us to ponder.

I was shown a letter in the editorial offices of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA sent by a young soldier in the Army to his parents. "You can't even imagine how difficult it is for me," he writes. "I get terribly tired. I can't run in classes and the boys laugh. Oh, Father, the fact is that you yourself served in the Army. Couldn't you really have suggested how to prepare for it?"

Behind the lines of this letter one perceives a son or, more precisely, an only son whom Mama spoiled and whom Papa would look at and sigh. There is seemingly nothing terrible about it; the parental home is there to please the family's child. But we also cannot forget that the child must be prepared for life's hardships. This means we adults and those young people must be more composed and responsible.

Just what does it seem to me that must be made the basis of a draftee's basic military training? Military commissariats now say that "we require each draftee to have a document showing he passed the norms of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] complex, and then we send the documents for a random check." This probably is necessary.

But does it make sense to limit oneself only to checking whether or not the GTO norms were passed, the more so as it happens (and very often!) where documents on their fulfillment do not confirm the true state of affairs? The military commissariats' role can be much more effective. They are capable of helping to make corrections in the general physical training program of predraft-age persons, to include DOSAAF sports sections in this training, and to make the sports contacts of pupils and servicemen more regular. Why not set up competitions of predraft-age persons and draftees by classes, groups and labor collectives? These competitions could be included in all games conducted by city public education departments, vocational-technical education administrations, and sports committees. The job of giving physical training to future soldiers is a sacred obligation of all organizations in which young people of predraft and draft age are studying or working.

When the latest call-up into the Armed Forces occurred last year, a festive evening in the Ostankino Television Center was devoted to this event, as the reader probably will recall. In viewing the broadcast, all of us were able to see convincing proof of the physical superiority of the eight naval infantrymen who instantaneously pulled out the rope being desperately held by ten draftees. And when we counted in concert the number of lifts of the weight we had no doubt that the soldier would win. Yes, the conditioning of military service means a great deal, but it is very important that this conditioning begin long before the Army. The physical preparedness of predraft-age youth is a matter of enormous state importance.

6904

CSO: 1801/183

HIGH COMMAND APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS

[The following pages list changes observed in the positions, ranks, and other relevant information concerning Soviet officers of the higher command levels of the USSR Ministry of Defense and related agencies. The list includes changes found in the Soviet print media between 1 January and 1 May 1985. As such it makes no pretense of being a complete accounting of the high command. Neither does it list every agency or subdivision with the Ministry of Defense, rather only those agencies in which changes were observed are included.

[The following abbreviations are used throughout: 'ap' indicates that the individual was officially appointed on the date given; 'id' indicates that the item referred to was first identified as such on the date given; 'n' is used where it is uncertain whether this officer or appointment was previously mentioned in the press, but at least that for purposes of this list, he or it was first observed on the date given.]

USSR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

1st Dep MoD.....PETROV, Vasiliy Ivanovich, Mar Soviet Union, (id 2 Feb 85 PRAVDA).

Dep MoD (Main Inspectorate).....GOVOROV, V., Army Gen, (id KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Apr 85 p 1).

Dep MoD (VVS).....YEFIMOV, A., Mar Soviet Union, CINC VVS (id VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 85 p 22).

Dep MoD (Personnel).....SHKADOV, Ivan Nikolayevich, Army Gen, id 18 Feb 82, b 2 May 1913, (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Mar 85 p 5).

GENERAL STAFF

CHIEF.....AKHROMEYEV, Sergey, Mar Soviet Union, (ap Sept. 1984).

MAIN INSPECTORATE

Chief Inspector.....GOVOROV, V., Army Gen, (id KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Apr 85 p 1).

ADMIN AND TECHNICAL AGENCIES

CADRE DIRECTORATE

Chf.....KUPRIYANOV, O., Lt Gen, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Feb 85 p 1).
(Previous incumbant..... SEREBRYANKOV, V., Lt Gen. n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
26 Feb. 1985, p. 4).

CIVILIAN MILITARY TRAINING

1st Dep Chief.....BOKOV, S., Lt Gen, (id KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Feb 85
p 2).

MAIN PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

Dep Chief.....ZVARSTEV, Aleksandr Mikhailovich, Col Gen., id 5 Dec
73, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Mar 85 p 5).

CONSTRUCTION AND BILLETING OF TROOPS

Chf Polit Admin.....BYCHENKO, V., Col Gen., (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 17
Mar 85 p 1).

MAIN MILITARY PROCURACY

Chief.....GORNYY, Artem Grigor'yevich, Col Gen Just, id 26 Feb 58,
b 9 Apr 1912, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Feb 85 p 2).

CENTRAL ARCHIVE

Dep Chief.....NAZAROV, V., Colonel, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Mar 85 p
3).

MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE (GlavPU)

Dep Chief.....NECHAYEV, V., Lt Gen, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Mar 85
p2).

DIRECTORATE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL-PARTY WORK

Chief.....STEFANOVSKIY, G., Maj Gen, (n 18 Jan 85 in KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 3, Feb 85, p 67).

DEPARTMENT FOR KOMSOMOL WORK

Assistant to Chief.....KOSHELEV, N., Col, (id KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Apr 85 p 4).

REAR SERVICES

CENTRAL MILITARY MEDICAL DIRECTORATE

Chief Therapist.....GEMBITSKIY, Ye., Lt Gen Med Serv, (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Apr 85 p 4). [Officer is listed here as the most likely place of subordination. Source listed Gembitskiy as 'Chief Therapist of the Ministry of Defense'].

RAIL-ROAD TROOPS

CINC.....MAKARTSEV, M., Col Gen, (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Mar 85 p 2).

Chief Polit Admin.....STOLYAROV, A., Lt Gen, (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Mar 85 p 2).

CENTRAL FINANCE DIRECTORATE

Dep Chief for Pension Affairs.....KOTLYAR, A.I., Maj Gen Intend Serv, id 16 Mar 1969. (n as Lieutenant General in IZVESTIYA. 26 Mar 85 p 3).

FORCES

AIR DEFENSE FORCES (PVO-S)

MAIN STAFF

Dep CINC for Surface to Air Missile Troops (ZRV).....KHYUPENEN, A.I., Lt Gen Arty, id Apr 83, (n as Col Gen in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 14 Apr 85 p 3).

Chf.....MAL'TSEV, I., Col Gen Avn, (n SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 13 Apr 85 p 2). (Previously identified as 1st Dep Chief of Main Staff 6 Jan 1981 with rank of Lt Gen Avn). (Previous incumbent in this position was ROMANOV, Semen Fedorovich, Col Gen, id 30 Dec 1979).

AIR FORCE (VVS)

CINC.....YEFIMOV, A., Mar Soviet Union, Dep MoD, (id VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 1, 1985, p 22).

Dep CINC.....BORSUK, A.F., Col Gen, (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Dec 84 p 2). (n as Dep CINC for Combat Training, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Jan 85 p 1).

CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES

Dep Chief Polit Admin.....DEMENT'YEV, Vladimir Timofeyevich, Col Gen., id 1 Sep 82, b 1920, (n VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA No 1, 1985, p 14).

GROUND FORCES

CINC.....IVANOVSKIY, Ye. F., Army Gen, (Id KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Feb 85).

Dep CINC for Armaments.....BAZHENOV, P., Col Gen, (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 24 Mar 85 p 1).

NAVAL FORCES (VMF)

MAIN STAFF

Dep Chief.....MATVEYEV, A., V Adm, (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Mar 85 p 2).

Chf Polit Admin.....MEDVEDEV, P.N., Adm., id Oct 1981, b 22 Jan 22,
(n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Feb 85 p 2).

THEATERS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (TVD's)

WESTERN TVD

CINC.....OGARKOV, N.V., Mar Soviet Union, (ap Sep 1984).

FAR EASTERN TVD

CINC.....TRET'YAK, I.M., Army Gen.

SOUTH-EAST TVD

CINC.....GERASIMOV, I.A., Army Gen, (N Dec. 84).

SOUTTHERN TVD

CINC.....MAKSIMOV, Yu. P., Army Gen, (n Dec. 84).

WARSAW PACT

CENTRAL GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) (CGSF)

CINC.....YERMAKOV, V., Col Gen, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 31 Jan 85 p 1).

GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES GERMANY (GSFG)

CINCKOCHETOV, Konstantin Alekseevich, Lt Gen (n 24 Aug 82).
Col Gen. (n 17 Sep 84 in KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 19, 1984).

NORTHERN GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES (POLAND) (NGSF)

CINC.....KOVTONOV, A., Col Gen, (ap Nov/Dec 1984 (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
30 Jan 85 p 2)).

Chief Polit Admin.....TITOV, I., Maj Gen, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Jan
85 p 2).

SOUTHERN GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES (HUNGARY) (SGSF).

Chief Polit Admin.....MAKUNIN, A., Army Gen, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 21
Dec 84 p 2).

Dep Chief Polit Admin.....BESHCHIEV, R., Maj Gen., (n KRSNAYA
ZVEZDA 8 Jan 85 p 2).

Dep Chief Polit AdminBILENKO, A. Maj Gen, (n 17 Sep 84 in
KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 19 1984).

MILITARY DISTRICTS

BALTIC MD

1st Dep CINC.....PANKRATOV, V.M., Lt Gen, (n SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 21 Feb 85 p 2). Also Chief of Staff. (Previous incumbent, Ivanov, Aleksandr Alekseyevich, Lt Gen, id 25 Aug 79).

1st Dep Chief Polit Admin.....BOYKO, N., Maj Gen, (SOVETSKAYA LITVA 23 Feb 85 p 2).

BELORUSSIAN MD

CINC.....SHURAVLEV, V., Lt Gen, (id KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Apr 85, p. 2). b 2 Apr 1935 (SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 3 Apr 85 p 3).

1st Dep CINC, Chief of Staff.....SOKOLOV, V., Lt Gen, (n ZVYAZDA, 23 Feb 85 p 2).

Chief Polit Admin.....KOLININICHENKO, Aleksej Nikolaevich, Lt Gen, (n SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 23 Feb 85 p 2). (Previous position: 1st Dep Chief of Polit Admin, Far East MD, id 7 May 1980).

1st Dep Chief Polit Admin.....ALEKSANDROV B., Maj Gen, (n 18 Jan 85 in KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 3, 85, p 95).

CARPATHIAN MD

1st Dep CINC.....KALININ, N., Lt Gen, (n 4 Feb 85, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 4, Feb 85 p 94).

Chf Polit Admin.....GONCHAROV, N.V., Lt Gen, (n SOVETSKIY VOIN, No 5, Mar 85, p 2, (Signed to press 14 Feb 85)).

CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARY DISTRICT

CINC.....LOBOV, V., Col Gen, ap Fall 1984 (n KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 1, 1985 p 94 (Previously identified as 1st Dep CINC Leningrad MD (rank Lt.Gen) 5 Nov 1981). (Previous CINC of Central Asian MD.....YAZOV, Dmitriy Timofeyevich, Col Gen, n 7 Jan 81, born 1923. Transferred to CINC FAR E MD (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Dec 84 p 2).)

1st Dep CINC, Chief of Staff.....SURAYKIN, N.M., Lt Gen, (n SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 23 Feb 85 p 3).

Dep CINC, Chief of Staff.....NURMAGANBETOV, Sagat Kozhakhmetovich,
Lt Gen, (id 28 Jan 85, PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, No 2, Feb. 1985, p. 76).
(Previous position 1st Dep CINC SGSF Hungary, id 31 May 81).

Chief of Polit Admin.....KOCHKIN, G., Maj Gen, (n KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNIKH SIL No 1, 1985 p 94).

FAR EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT

CINC.....YAZOV, D., (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Dec 84 p 2. b 1923).
(Previously CINC Central Asian MD).

Chief Polit Admin.....KIZYUN, N., Lt Gen, (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Dec
84 p 2). (Previous incumbent - NOVIKOV, Vasiliy Petrovich, Col Gen, id 4 June
79, b 1924).

KIEV MD

CINC.....OSIPOV, V. Col Gen, (n 14 Jan 85, POD ZNAMENEM LENINISM,
No 2, Jan 85 p 35).

Chief Polit Admin.....ARAPOV, V., Lt Gen., (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22
Jan 85 p 2).

1st Dep Chief Polit Admin.....KORABLEV, V., Maj Gen., (n KRASNAYA
ZVEZDA 8 Jan 85 p 2).

LENINGRAD MD

Chief of Staff.....OMELICHEV, B., Lt Gen, (id KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Apr
85).

Chief Polit Admin.....LARIN, I., Maj Gen, (id KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Apr
85).

CONSTRUCTION AND BILLETING OF TROOPS

Chief Polit Dept.....KALOV, D., Col., (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Apr 85 p
2).

MOSCOW MD

Chief Polit Admin.....REPIN, Ivan Petrovich, Col Gen, id 6 May 82,
b 1920, (n VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 1, 1985, p 3).

1st Dep Chief Polit Admin.....GORELOV, R., Maj Gen, (n 4 Feb 85 in
KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 4, Feb 85 p 41).

Dep Cdr for Avia.....KULIKOV, Yu., Maj Gen., (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 4
Jan 85 p 2).

NORTH CAUCASUS MD

Chief Polit Admin.....AUNAPU, Ye., Lt Gen., (id KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 18
Jan 85 p 2).

1st Dep Chief of Polit Admin.....KOVALEVSKIY, M., Maj Gen, (n
KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Apr 85 p 2).

SIBERIAN MD

CINC.....VOSTROV, V., Col Gen, ap late 1984 (id KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 10
Jan 85 p 2).

1st Dep Cdr.....TKACH, B., Lt Gen, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Apr 85 p
2).

TRANSBAIKAL MD

CINC.....POSTNIKOV, S., Col Gen, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Apr 85 p 4).

TRANSCAUCASUS MD

CINC.....ARKHIPOV, V., Col Gen, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Jan 85 p 2).

ACTING CINC (1st Dep).....SOTSKOV, Mikhail Mikhailovich, Lt. Gen,
(id as 1st Dep Cdr 25 Jul 82). (n as 'Acting Cinc', ZARYA VOSTOKA 24 Mar 85 p
3).

Chief Polit Admin.....GULEVICH, V. L., Lt Gen, (n KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 2
Jan 85 p 1, and ZARYA VOSTOKA 23 Feb 85 p 3). (Previous position 1st Dep Chief,
rank Maj Gen, id 19 Feb 1980). (Previous incumbent.....SHIRINKIN,
Aleksey Ivanovich, Lt Gen, id 11 May 1980).

Dep Chief of Polit Admin.....MERKUSHEV, N., Maj Gen, (N KRSNAYA
ZVEZDA 2 Mar 85 p. 2).

TURKESTAN MD

CINC.....POPOV, N.I., Col Gen, (n PRAVDA VOSTOKA 23 Feb 85 p 1).

1st Dep Chief Polit Admin.....OVCHINNIKOV, A.I., Maj Gen, (n
TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 23 Feb 85 p 3).

URAL MD

CINC.....GRACHEV, N., Lt Gen., (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Jan 85 p 3).

Chief Polit Admin.....ZINCHENKO, O., Maj Gen., (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3
Jan 85).

VOLGA MD

Dep CINC.....LEONEV, Ye., Lt Gen, (n KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Mar 85 p 1).

NAVAL FLEETS

BLACK SEA FLEET

1st Dep CINC.....KHRONOPOULO, M., V ADM., (id KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Jan 85 p 2).

NORTHERN FLEET

1st Dep Chief Polit Admin.....KOROVIN, A., Capt 1st Rank, (n KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 2, 1985, p 94).

PACIFIC FLEET

1st Dep Chief of Polit Admin.....STEPANOV, A., Capt 1st Rank, (id KRSNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Apr 85 p 2). (Promoted from Dep Chief of Polit Directorate for Agitprop. Replaces R Adm A. M. SLAVSKIY (id 2 Dec 80).)

MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

KIEV HIGHER ANTI-AIRCRAFT ROCKET ENGINEERING SCHOOL i. S.M. KIROV

Chief of Polit Section.....AVER'YANOV, R., Maj Gen, (n VESTNIK PVO,
No 2, 85, p 45).

RELATED AGENCIES

DOSA AF

SECRETARY of DOSAAF CC.....BALAKIREV, V.I., Lt Gen., (n KRASNAYA
ZVEZDA 22 Dec 84 p 2).

MILITARY COMMISSARIATES

GEORGIAN SSR

SHARASHENIDZE, L., Maj Gen, (n Tbilisi, KOMMUNIST, 14 Nov 84).

CSO: 1801/214

ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

Lack of Ritual Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 85 p 2

[Response to a letter from Cpt K. Medvedev: "Such Forgetfulness..."]

[Text] This is how Cpt K. Medvedev entitled his letter to the editor; the letter was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 12 Oct 84. In the letter, the captain criticized his aviation unit's inadequacies in educating the unit's personnel in the heroic traditions of the Armed Forces of the USSR and in the use of army rituals for this important work.

As was reported to the editorial staff, the first deputy of the chief of the Central Group of Forces' political director, Maj Gen H. Shlaga, severely reminded officers Ye. Belozarov and V. Yemelyanov about the need to comply with all the elements of the army's ritual for the send-off of service members being released to the reserve. Exhibits and various materials for setting up a room showing the unit's combat glory are being assembled.

The military council of the Central Group of Forces, while discussing the preparations for the 40th anniversary of our Great Victory, passed a decree on the subsequent intensification of the heroic-patriotic education of unit and subunit personnel and focused the attention of commanders, staffs and political agencies on the need to use the experience of the veterans of the USSR's Armed Forces, their glorious traditions and the heroic spirit of today's daily training in this work.

The Group's political leadership made recommendations to the formation and unit political agencies for the improvement of the training of personnel in the heroic traditions of the USSR's Armed Forces and in the use of army rituals in this work. These issues were reviewed at assemblies of commanders, political leaders and the party and Komsomol aktiv.

Use of Repasts Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jan 85 p 2

[Response to a newspaper contribution by Col G. Ivanov: "Supper in the Preventorium"]

[Text] In a newspaper article by G. Ivanov published under the above headline on 23 Oct 84, a point was made concerning the sumptuous repasts used by officials to try to influence favorably inspectors and ensure an undeservedly high evaluation for their work. For example, during the inspection of one aviation unit of the Central Asian Military District, the unit would not have passed the inspection without the abovementioned repast.

As the first deputy of the political section of the Air Force district, Lt Col V. Vasilyev, reported to the editorial staff, the statement in the newspaper was reviewed at a session of the Air Force district's military council, a conference of the aviation unit's leaders, by the political section and party committee of the Air Force district's leadership, and also at general meetings of officers and warrant officers. Specific measures were determined to strengthen the struggle against the shortcomings published in the paper. The people's supervisory committee prepared to inspect the legalities of such use of the unit's financial resources. Maj V. Shchegol'kov who organized and served the repast to the inspectors was called to account before the party and brought before a senior officers' comrades' court of honor. Warrant Officer V. Bortnikov, who helped Shchegol'kov, was brought before a warrant officers' comrades' court of honor. They were required to pay material compensation for the losses incurred.

Unfortunately, no one learned from the newspaper article what kind of punishment was meted out to those who took part in the repast.

The newspaper contribution "Supper in the Preventorium" reproved an officer Yu. Voyevoda. However, as was revealed, the correspondent had only met once with this officer several years ago; while the correspondent was preparing his newspaper article, he never asked how the officer was serving today and whether he had overcome his earlier shortcomings. The chief of the political section of the military school where Comrade Yu. Voyevoda was serving reported to the editorial staff that this officer was currently regarded in a favorable light and was conscientiously performing his duties.

As a result of this, the editorial staff apologized to Comrade Voyevoda. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent G. Ivanov was severely disciplined for his oversight.

Close Inspections Ordered

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 85 p 2

[Response to a newspaper article by Lt Col Ziyeminsh: "The Manipulators"]

[Text] This was how Lt Col M. Ziyeminsh' critical newspaper article was entitled; it was published 13 Oct 84 and contained references to violations in the finance management activity of a unit.

As Maj Gen O. Kichayev reported to the editorial staff, the facts cited in the letter were true. Col A. Strelayev was warned about his need to comply totally with service requirements. Other guilty officials were called to account before the organization and party.

By order of the political section, the bath-sauna was turned over to the trade union committee as a preventorium to be used for medical purposes.

A response to the newspaper's statement was received over the signature of the acting military procurator of the Volga Region Military District, Lt Col V. Kruchkov. His letter reported in particular that the material losses incurred by the state would be made up by the guilty parties.

A response was also received from the finance agency; it was signed by colonels V. Morozov and I. Voytko. Their letter stated that inspecting personnel and all communists participating in inspections and spot-checks of subdepartment units were instructed at a session of an expanded party office about the need to increase the quality of these inspections and checks, focusing particular attention on whether strict compliance with the laws concerning the management of capital construction and utilization of physical assets was being practiced.

Displaying Real Responsibility

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 85 p 2

[Letter to the editor from military pilot 1st class and flight commander, Maj E. Zhestkin: "Responsibility... for Show"]

[Text] Respected editors! I want to state frankly that not everything is well with the state of military discipline in our subunit. It is just for this reason that a decision was made to introduce the duty of responsible officers who would supervise whether manual regulations were being complied with by the soldiers, assist junior officers, etc. We have had such a system for less than a year, but it continues to grow ever more complicated. More and more officers are being added to this subunit duty. However, the number of infractions against military discipline has not decreased.

In my opinion, the point is that this responsibility is frequently here for show and for the sake of form. For example, there was this incident... On that day, Sgt V. Gayayev was not on the base; he had been drinking and was

detained by a city patrol. The officer responsible was a Sr Lt V. Zhuravlev. He failed to notice the soldier's absence, because he had relied on the people of the daily guard detail to cover for him. On the other hand, the detail had concluded that Zhuravlev was supposed to make sure that everyone was on base. And so, reports were sent to the unit's duty officer, Maj G. Yakimenko: There had been no incident...

Briefly put: All forces are mobilized to strengthen discipline, but one ought to see how these "forces" operate.

We "responsible ones" get together, sometimes in the duty officer's room, and play dominos and cards, read books, etc. If someone receives a tasking from the political officer, he converses with the personnel present. However, it is not necessary to talk about the quality of such prepared and hurried measures.

This is what I think: Instead of "covering yourself" with responsibility for show, the right officials within the subunit should comply with official regulations more energetically. This does not happen. How the daily guard detail operates should be set straight; junior commanders should be thoughtfully instructed as to how they should work with people individually: I don't even remember when the Day of the Sergeant was last celebrated in our unit. They should also know how to organize free time. Only once were we visited by some show people, but we were busy having classes.

The officers themselves need to be taught how to train subordinates; they should show what responsibility is in deed and not limit themselves only to "bawling out" the men. Measures for show and "bawling outs" do not produce results.

New Rubric Instituted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jan 85 p 4

[Collection of letters dealing with legal questions answered by legal experts: "A Legal Expert Comments on the Mail"]

[Text] At readers' conferences and in letters to the editor, the readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA suggested that more attention be paid to the propaganda of Soviet laws, military regulations, and other normative statutes, especially in the practice of their application. The letters to us contain many specific requests to explain this or that legality, and evaluate this or that real-world situation from a judicial point of view.

In order to answer all of these suggestions and requests, we are beginning a new rubric: "A Legal Expert Comments on the Mail." Experienced lawyers and members of a section, independent of the editorial staff, but dealing with legal propaganda, will jointly participate in the preparation of the materials for this rubric.

We await your letters, comrades, containing questions of a legal nature.

A Soldier Votes

[Question] L. Lebed: This year, my son, Igor, will vote in the elections for the first time. This also will occur while he is in the army. I would like to know how elections in his unit are organized. Are there any things different here?

[Answer] Col Justice V. Strekozov: Any differences are stipulated by the specificities of the military services; in other words, yes, they do exist. All of them are precisely covered in Soviet voter laws.

Let us say that individual voter districts can be set up on the territory of military units and formations for elections to the local soviets if the appropriate ispolkoms decide to do so. The unit commanders compile voter-service member lists and assist the voter commissions in the implementation of their authority.

Basically, elections in units and on ships are conducted as they are throughout the country. The legal provision that Soviet service members "possess the same voting rights as all citizens" is implemented in the same manner.

After Release to the Reserves

[Question] Reserve Maj B. Ivanov: In the summer, I wrote to you that the Maritime Rayispolkom of Odessa had refused to treat me as a privileged case with regard to issuing me a dwelling to replace the one I gave up at my last duty station as I was released to the reserves. They explained their refusal to me with the fact that I was registered with my wife and son in my parents' apartment where the metric area per person is a bit above that level at which the city of Odessa usually improves dwelling conditions.

After your intervention with the rayon procurator, they began to give me preferential treatment. But is this proper? That we have to use such means to get something guaranteed to us by law?

[Answer] Col Justice V. Leyba: Respected Boris Nikolayevich! Hands down, preferential treatment due to people should be forthcoming without red tape and nerveracking experiences. In the given situation, the officials at the ispolkom are at fault for not having explained to you the route you had to take to receive your entitlements.

The point is that our laws recognize 2 basic categories of citizens who need improvements in their housing conditions: subtenants who do not have the right to the given housing, and those who do have this right, but are provided with living space less than that established by the oblast and kray. It is clear that reserve officers and members of their families, who are awaiting housing to replace that given up in garrison, belong to the first of

these 2 categories. The situation is also not changed by the fact that a reserve officer chooses to live temporarily with his parents. In such a case, the law even allows a residence permit without considering living conditions, keeping in mind that one can temporarily live awhile under conditions worse than they should be.

However, it also happens that the parents' living space is so large that the reserve officer's family decides to stay there. It is obvious that even this is not prohibited. The ispolkom, however, considers the living space requirements of such a family virtually met. It was just this that happened in your case, Boris Nikolayevich.

On the other hand, however, the ispolkom did not consider the fact that the presence of the reserve officer's family definitely worsened the living conditions of his parents, or than people often live together with their own families. This problem has also been solved by a new ispolkom decision.

Outside of the Law, Outside of Morality

[Question] Gds Sr Lt A. Kamennik: I often think about the press-cutting in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 18 Jul 82: "Recently, on the streets of besieged Beirut and after an Israeli air strike, a girl picked up a shinny white bell from the ground. She did not get a chance to hear its ring: The toy was actually a camouflaged bomb..."

I would think that there are international norms of law which prohibit such foul deeds; aren't there?

[Answer] Col Justice V. Seregin: The atrocities committed and being committed by Israeli aggressors in Lebanon cannot help, but arouse just anger. They shamelessly trample not only morality, but even the norms of international law.

There is actually a prohibition against these so-called booby-trapped objects. We are talking here about a special Convention and its corresponding protocol passed at an international conference in Geneva in 1980. Supported by these documents, the use of booby-trapped objects "in the shape of a seemingly harmless portable object," including those which resemble children's toys and other objects meant for children, is forbidden under any circumstances.

Moreover, several states, including Israel, have not signed this Convention. This means that a booby-trap, dropped from an Israeli aircraft, is not the whim of a single monster pilot, but the result of the aggressor country's state policy.

Library Books Disappear

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 85 p 4

[Response to a private's letter by Lt Col M Lishniy, correspondent with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Major Calamities for a Small Library"]

[Text] The concise, one-and-a-half page letter from Pvt A. Birukov produced incredulity at first. Is it possible that such a thing could happen in a library? First, it is open, then books disappear, otherwise, books are issued only to those people who please the political officer.

Here I am in a small garrison deep in the middle of some forest. Having found out about the complaint, the subunit commander's deputy for the political section, Maj V. Perizhnak, was not surprised: "I should have anticipated this. While I was on leave, some one tried to settle accounts with me."

What Valeriy Grigor'evich was implying became clear afterwards. For starters, we went to the library; step by step, the facts written about in the letter started to turn out to be true.

Approximately 3 years ago, Maj Perizhnak came here to fill the position of the commander's deputy for political affairs. It is precisely the political officer who is responsible for the library's books: the library is not a part of the unit's Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) and duties are performed in the library by a drafted soldier. Thus, Valeriy Grigor'evich arrived and, as he himself stated: "began to put things in order." Simply put, he started to write off any missing books.

Perizhnak told me: "When I took over the position, I took my predecessor, Maj Fashchenko, at his word that all the books were here. Afterwards, it turned out that, quantitatively speaking, this was true, but not qualitatively. The space for fiction was filled with textbooks. Moreover, the books of fiction should have been written off long ago. And so, it was necessary to write off the missing books of fiction as if they had become worn..."

How easily and simply Valeriy Grigor'evich had taken care of the matter. The books were written off according to the catalogue: 94 rubles 37 kopecks, 100 rubles 68 kopecks, and 99 rubles 51 kopecks. The official record entry for all of them was the same: "Dilapidated, unfit for further use."

Why was this so? Was it possible that the machinations with the books went unnoticed by inspection agencies, party and Komsomol organizations and the public?

The library's work was inspected by a representative of the next-higher political agency, Maj V. Chanov, who ... "did not notice any violation." Moreover, he gave his okay to write off a new batch of "books unfit for further use." The library's own commission inspected the library's work, the

number of books and the rules for their use. The commission "did not notice" anything either. Only after there "was nothing to read," as Sr Lt V. Ryshko and Warrant Officer P. Zolotov told me, was still another commission appointed. This commission was made up by Sr Lt V. Khilko, and warrant officers Ya. Chervinok and A. Nekrasov. Having conducted an inventory, the commission members wrote in their report: "The books are not classified according to the card catalogue tables; this does not permit keeping a precise count of the books. Pamphlets are not counted properly; they are entered in the total book count of the basic stock, and those pamphlets which should be written off are not written off and destroyed in a timely manner. Minor repairs are not made on the books; a number of the books of the basic stock are maintained in secondary locations."

This time, the commission "did notice" the chaos prevalent in the library; however, the chaos was depicted in rather shallow terms. As it was, the absence of "classification" was nothing else than the premeditated confusion of the book count, and the inclusion of pamphlets in the total book count of the basic stock was an act through which books of fiction were taken from the library and replaced with pulp literature. Maintaining books of the basic stock in secondary locations, one of which, it turned out, was Maj Perizhnak's apartment; this also permitted someone to issue an interesting book to one person, but to deny the same book to another.

Let the wording on the condition of the book supply remain on the commission's conscience; but, one way or another, the conclusion drawn by the commission was correct: "The library's operations should correspond to the 'provision concerning the libraries of the Soviet Army and Navy.'"

Well, so what? After all this, the political officer instructed that a further 190 copies of various books be writted off at a sum of 96 rubles 26 kopecks.

The commander, who had agreed so willingly before, now protested. Allegedly, how much can be done? Someone has to pay! But who? The political officer is the responsible one. Perizhnak, however, did not pay this time either, especially when Valeriy Grigor'evich's statement on how much money was at stake became better understood. He appealed to his former commander. He allegedly said that the library was not TO&E, and that the librarian was a soldier; people were pilfering books from him.

The senior commander backed down: "Write them off." Although he knew quite well that it was not the soldier's fault.

So how were the commission's recommendations on putting the library on the right track as required by regulations carried out? They were not. The books remaining in the library were arranged on the shelves in no particular order or stood in piles on the floor. Records are again not kept. The library's operations are again outside of regulations.

Propaganda Officers Reproached

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 85 p 2

[Response to correspondent Col V. Nagorniy's newspaper contribution: "Life Dictates"]

[Text] This was the title of Col V. Nagorniy's newspaper contribution published 17 Nov 84. The contribution criticized the organization of competition in one of the unit's subunits along with the style of Cpt A. Demenin's propaganda work.

The chief of the political section reported to the editorial staff that the facts were confirmed. The newspaper contribution was studied and discussed at a conference of the unit's leaders, in the political section, and at subunit commanders assemblies. The political section developed and issued the subunits recommendations on how to organize socialist competition in accordance with the requirements of regulation manuals; classes to study these requirements were conducted.

Subunit commander Cpt G. Minkovetskiy and the deputy of the political section, Lt V. Vatutin, were called to account before the party for neglect in their service and the poor state of political training. The unit's propaganda officer, Cpt A. Demenin, was relieved of his position for poor duty performance and negligence in the execution of his service obligations and demoted.

12247

CSO: 1801/139

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ARMED FORCES

OFFICER IDENTIFICATION: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 26 February 1985 carries on page 2 a 250-word report entitled "Awards Presented," by Major N. Gorin which identifies Lieutenant General S. Bokov as the first deputy chief of civilian military training in the USSR Ministry of Defense.

CSO: 1801/176

ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

SOKOLOV, RAUL CASTRO MEET--USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU S. L. Sokolov met with Army Gen Raul Castro Ruiz, Politburo member, second secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the Councils of State and Ministers, minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba on 19 March. There was a warm, friendly talk on matters of mutual interest. Participating in the talk were Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Mar SU S. F. Akhromeyev and Cuban Communist Party Central Committee Politburo Member J. Risquet Valdes. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 85 p 1] 6904

CSO: 1801/185

GROUND FORCES

TACTICAL PROBLEMS OF OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 85 p 1

[Report by senior permanent correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for the Transcaucasus Military District Lt Col Nikolay Matveyevich Mulyar with commentary by Lt Gen M. Sotskov, first deputy commander of Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "The Fight for the Pass"]

[Text] Lt Col Nikolay Matveyevich Mulyar has been appointed senior permanent correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for the Transcaucasus Military District. We publish his first article.

The exercise director carefully studied the commander's work map. The pencil point slid along the brown field, each time returning to the point with an elevation of more than 2,000 m above sea level. There was the pass which would allow the motorized riflemen to shorten the route considerably.

The commander was faced with a choice: either send the column along the mountain road providing a relatively high rate of march, or take the trail to the pass. The latter was much shorter, but also much more difficult. Avalanches and snowdrifts were lying in wait for the subunits along this route. In addition, the "enemy's" tactical groups which had managed to infiltrate through the pass certainly would emplace minefields on its approaches.

The road to the pass was especially difficult during the present winter, which had much snow. Nevertheless, relying on his subordinates' good training, the commander decided to take the short route permitting arrival at the designated line 24 hours earlier. A forward detachment consisting of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion commanded by Capt L. Davidyan was to capture the pass.

The combat vehicles made their way higher and higher into the mountains. Abundant snowfall with a strong wind restricted visibility. It was especially difficult for Sr Lt A. Shtemplyuk's subordinates operating in the advance party. The drivers were operating the armored personnel carriers [APC's] literally by feel, pressing to the sheer cliffs and penetrating the snowdrifts. In a number of sectors they had to take up shovels and use the self-recovery beams to advance several tens of meters. Only vigorous actions permitted avoiding a snowy imprisonment.

Overcoats and jackets became hard in the cold wind. At times my fingers refused to obey. It was difficult for everyone, but each of the soldiers stubbornly cleared the road in the snow and helped the equipment. The platoons commanded by sergeants V. Tarasov and G. Yeruslanov in this exercise functioned skillfully and resolutely.

It seemed the advance party had covered the most difficult sector when the motorized riflemen encountered an "enemy" ambush. Conditions for the fight were unfavorable. Displaying high efficiency, Sr Lt Shtemplyuk took his subordinates out from under the fire and used a small rocky ridge as cover. The platoon commanded by Sgt Yeruslanov received the mission of executing an enveloping maneuver on skis and moving to the "enemy's" flank. The ambush was destroyed by an attack from two directions.

The motorized riflemen sighed in relief: the outlines of the pass already could be made out through the curtain of snow. But as it turned out, the last hundreds of meters of the path were the most difficult. The scouts reported on snow obstructions arranged by the "enemy." The approaches to them were mined. The commander sent forward a march support detachment headed by Maj P. Kotelko.

Combat engineers cleared a passage of mines. Engineer vehicles began clearing snow. Engines overheated from overloads and lines broke but the people didn't give up. The actions of the combat engineer company commanded by Sr Lt S. Svalov received high marks from the exercise director. When the obstructions had been cleared, tankmen of the company commanded by Capt A. Golovin and motorized riflemen of the battalion headed by Maj O. Brylev distinguished themselves right at the pass.

A fight broke out in different sectors, as most often happens in the mountains. The companies were not always able to support each other by fire. Much depended on the officers' independence and initiative. They displayed these qualities fully. The fire of attached artillery was powerful and effective, and it permitted the motorized riflemen to drive the "enemy" from the pass by a daring attack.

At the correspondent's request, Lt Gen M. Sotskov, first deputy commander of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, commented on results of the exercise.

We tried to create a difficult tactical situation in the exercise. With regard to weather conditions, they were unusually unfavorable. We haven't had such snow in the Transcaucasus for many years. The staff, subunit commanders and all personnel had a good opportunity to improve mountain training and the abilities to make confident use of combat equipment and weapons under difficult conditions.

Constant emphasis is placed on mountain training in district units. A developed network of mountain training centers, firing ranges and tank training areas has been established. The personnel learn to cross gorges and canyons over suspension bridges and to negotiate mountain rivers and sheer cliffs. Artillerymen acquire skills in conducting fire upward and downward from slopes

and with batteries deployed along roads and mountain routes. Tankmen perfect the ability to maneuver on steep upgrades and downgrades and to hit targets with the vehicle tilted sideways. In short, each combat arm has its own program and its own features in methodology in the mountains. Of course, actions in the mountains demand special conditioning of the commanders and all personnel.

The exercise in question demonstrated the soldiers' high physical and psychological conditioning. Party-political work was effective. Party members inspired all soldiers by personal example. It was collectivism and mutual help at all levels that contributed to successful mission accomplishment.

It is understandable that exercises also identify gaps in subunit training and in the professional training of individual officers. In this case omissions were discovered in preparing some vehicles for operations under conditions of extremely low temperature. Interruptions sometimes occurred in the work of communications equipment due to the screening effect of mountains and heavy "enemy" communications jamming. Meanwhile, units have gained experience in providing uninterrupted communications in the mountains, in the capable use of relaying, and in effective countermeasures to "enemy" technical means. The motorized riflemen have to adopt this experience, and at the same time place more emphasis on control using signals.

The exercise under especially difficult weather conditions also taught the following lesson. Snowdrifts and the danger of avalanches limited the opportunity for extensive use of deep and close envelopments and raiding operations. The main burden rested on subunits operating from the front. This means we also cannot preclude that method of accomplishing the mission and we have to provide these subunits with engineer equipment, additional communications equipment, and entrenching tools.

Every exercise in the mountains is unique and we see the task as one of ensuring that experience gained in a varying tactical, climatic and weather situation becomes the property of all district units.

6904

CSO: 1801/182

GROUND FORCES

OFFICERS FAULTED FOR TANK UNIT FAILING IN EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col G. Miranovich, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "What Led to a Disruption of Scheduled Classes in Tank Regiment 'X': An Incident at the Range"]

[Text] That night it was planned to hold control classes in weapon training in the battalion commanded by Maj V. Dudin. Considering that the winter training period was coming to a close, the unit command element hoped to see the teamwork and skill appropriate to the moment in the tankmen's actions. And even the atmosphere in the sector of the moving-target tank gunnery range assigned to the battalion and where we arrived with Gds Lt Col N. Kiselev, a representative of the division [soyedineniye] political department, not long before the beginning of classes inspired optimism. Hardly had dusk fallen when the panels of operator consoles at the sector control point lit up, lanterns blazed up at the initial position and at the open-fire and cease-fire lines, and simulators of "enemy" antitank fire and the fire of other weapons winked in the field... In short, the electronics functioned faultlessly.

The 3d Tank Company commanded by Sr Lt N. Tel'charov, which according to the schedule was to open up a series of night control problems in the battalion, also did not keep us waiting. It was at the range at the designated time.

But we did not succeed in seeing the tankmen in action either at the hour indicated in the schedule or three hours later (and that amount of time was given to Sr Lt Tel'charov and his subordinates) because two of the three tanks assigned to the company were unprepared for firing. The class naturally also was disrupted in the company which was to fire in that same sector following 3d Tank Company.

And so it can be said that an incident occurred in the regiment. Just how did those responsible for organization of the firing and for their political, technical and other support react to this?

Maj Yu. Pakhomov, who represented the regimental staff here, was the principal character in the sector. This is explained by the fact that a special group from among headquarters officers has been formed in the unit each day of late to supervise fulfillment of the order of the day and to assist subunit commanders in organizing the training process and competition. One such group was headed now by Maj Pakhomov.

"We'll look into it," was all he could say concerning what happened.

Paying due respect to Maj Pakhomov, who did much to see that all vehicles assigned to the control classes in weapon training were standing in formation by morning, it should be noted at the same time that there was nothing unexpected in what occurred on that freezing night in 1st Tank Battalion.

Let's begin with what lies on the surface, so to speak.

The following detail, for example, immediately draws attention. Sr Lt Tel'charov and his subordinates learned that the tanks were not prepared for firing only at the last moment, when it was already necessary to begin classes. Meanwhile, a servicing day had been held in the regiment on the day before with one of its purposes being, as the regulation prescribes, the servicing of weapons, combat equipment and other equipment. Consequently, the tankmen had an opportunity, if not to do everything as was necessary, then at least to prevent the wrongful waste of training time (for example, by replacing the firing with the practice of certain other lessons). But no one, including specialists of the armored and other services directly involved in keeping equipment and weapons in appropriate readiness, troubled themselves to take proper steps.

What does this indicate? Above all, obviously, the fact that not everything is all right in the regiment concerning technical training. And this is not just at the company level. Events which unfolded at the range after Maj N. Neklyudov, deputy battalion commander for technical affairs, and other specialists arrived there on an urgent basis at Maj Pakhomov's summons convinced us of this in particular. They fooled around with the vehicles almost the entire night in search of ways to solve a technical problem which was not that difficult for people of their profession.

Nevertheless, as further familiarity with the regiment's life showed, deficiencies in the professional training of some specialists is merely one cause and far from the only cause of the failure.

Let's assume that the precondition for the incident remained unnoticed during the servicing day because of someone's incompetency (something which, honestly speaking, I don't wish to believe). But the fact that the commander of the company (which, by the way, had assumed rather high pledges in competition) took subordinates out to fire without even having inquired into the technical status of vehicles placed at his disposal can't be explained by incompetency. This is already quite a different matter, as they say. And if we are to be objective, this probably is not only a problem involving Sr Lt Tel'charov, who was in the center of events on that ill-fated night simply through the whim of chance.

I will anticipate the objection that the company went out to the range according to schedule. Yes, according to schedule, but this still doesn't mean that this was the company which had to begin. Control classes, especially at the end of the training period, are, in the language of the tankmen themselves, the same as registration prior to firing for the record. Especially much depends here on who sets the tone. The 3d Tank Company doesn't stand out in the best

light. Other companies surpass it in a number of indicators, including weapon training. Even for the sake of justice it would have been more advisable to give one of them the right to fire the first round, as a moral incentive, so to speak, which unquestionably would have helped maintain an atmosphere of competitiveness in the collective.

But as we already know, people who, to put it mildly, were not quite ready for this received the right to fire first. Suffice it to say that some of them didn't know the exercise conditions even after three hours at the range.

There need be no surprise at this: it already was proven long ago that formalism in organizing combat training and competition, as in any other matter, has not yet led anyone to success. Wasn't this the primary reason for the failure which beset the battalion? By the way, not just the battalion...

We are speaking of the regiment, regarded until recently as one of the best in the district. Soldiers still serve here who were present when it was awarded the district military council challenge red banner, conferred on the regiment for successes in competition. But now the situation has changed. The tankmen did not fulfill their pledges in the last training year and the regiment turned up among the laggards.

Officers of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces who conducted a final inspection in the unit graphically and convincingly proved that this didn't happen by chance and not because luck suddenly betrayed the leaders. The regiment surrendered its position in competition largely because of formalism and deficiencies in organizing the training process, duties, and indoctrinational work with the personnel.

Such a conclusion would appear to be enough for those to whom it is addressed to seriously ponder their work style. It is addressed above all to the officers, from the regimental commander to the platoon commander. And generally one cannot say that they remained deaf to the commission's conclusions and recommendations. A thorough work plan was drawn up to remedy the deficiencies. Judging from the grades, many of its points were fulfilled. Then why is the picture largely repeating itself even now, several months after the inspection?

The document reflecting results of the past training year, which I was shown in division headquarters, contains the following entry by the inspector from Moscow: "Not all incidents in the regiment are given a sharp and fundamental evaluation." In my view, this entry sheds light on much of what we have been discussing here.

As a matter of fact, would that same Sr Lt Tel'charov, for example, really have begun to tempt fate had he firmly known that a very strict accounting would have been demanded of him for poor preparation for the classes? That means he was counting on the senior commanders' condescension and their readiness to go along with things, as the saying goes, and declare the disruption of classes to be accidental.

Strictly speaking, that is what happened. The night incident at the range did not receive a swift, fundamental evaluation in the regiment.

I wouldn't like to draw far-reaching conclusions. Time will show whether or not the tankmen will be able to return the regiment's past glory. But I can't help recalling one other episode involving the very same battalion.

There was a scheduled drill training class in the company commanded by Sr Lt V. Leont'yev on the day following the unsuccessful night firing, but the company did not appear on the drill field that day.

No comment is necessary, as the saying goes.

6904

CSO: 1801/182

GROUND FORCES

OFFICER IDENTIFICATION: TRANSCAUCASUS MD

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 30 January 1985 carries on page 2 a 100-word article by Major N. Kikeshev under the rubric "Komsomol Conferences." The article lists Colonel General V. Arkhipov as the commander in chief of the Transcaucasus Military District.

OFFICER IDENTIFICATION: SIBERIAN MD

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 10 January 1985 carries on page 2 a 100-word article by Colonel N. Fedoseyev under the rubric "Komsomol Conferences" which identifies Colonel General V. Vostrov as the commander in chief of the Siberian Military District.

OFFICER IDENTIFICATION: MOSCOW MD

[Editorial Report] Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 4 of February 1985 (signed to press on 4 February 1985) carries on pages 41-47 an article by Major General R. Gorelov entitled "With a High Degree of Exactingness." The article identifies him as the first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District.

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CSO: 1801/176

NAVAL FORCES

'KIEV' IN DAMAGE-CONTROL EXERCISE

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 85 p 1

[Report by Capt-Lt P. Vladimirov: "A 'Fire' Aboard the Cruiser"]

[Text] "The 'Akagi' took two direct hits: one in the after break of the central elevator and another in a section of the flight deck along the port side. Under ordinary conditions not one of these hits would have been able to disable such a giant as an aircraft carrier, but the explosions of fuel and ammunition caused by the fire sowed death and destruction... Flames spread with lightning speed along the after part of the flight deck, enveloping aircraft lined up wingtip to wingtip one after the other. Torpedoes began to explode, making the fight against fire impossible..."

Capt 1st Rank G. Yasnitskiy, commander of the air-capable cruiser "Kiev," unquestionably read about this battle of Japanese carriers against American aviation at Midway atoll. Past experience indicates that despite their enormous might, large combatant ships still cannot count on total invulnerability in combat. This means we must be able to fight for their survival. And, as the history of naval warfare again confirms, damage control of a large combatant ship is especially difficult. One must prepare for this thoroughly and comprehensively.

...After destroying an "enemy" submarine and beating off an attack by a group of his aircraft, the air-capable cruiser "Kiev" nevertheless also received serious damages. Information about their nature and consequences flowed from the air department (BCh-6) to the executive officer, who generalized and checked it and informed the ship's commander about it.

A display diagram lit up before Capt 1st Rank Yasnitskiy's eyes, showing the ship's cross-section in the vertical plane. All damages were registered here, but the commander had to picture the cruiser not in one plane, but in three dimensions, with those adjacent spaces where water and fire held the upper hand. No visual memory is sufficient for this, and so an EVM [electronic computer] helps the commander thoroughly estimate the situation, which means making a correct decision. The computer specifically helps, since there are factors which only a commander is capable of considering, such as, for example, the training of damage-control parties and the personnel's moral-combat state...

Water is "flooding" certain compartments and "fire" is on the upper deck and in internal spaces of the air department. The cruiser "took" a list to starboard and trim by the stern. Some of the navymen were "overboard" and there were "wounded"... Information continued to come, but Capt 1st Rank Yasnitskiy now already understands the capabilities of the department to fight the "fire."

Then a report was received ashore from the "Kiev" about the situation at hand. The shore control station made the decision to use the exercise aboard the ship to train an auxiliary vessel and a rescue vessel.

The air-capable cruiser "Kiev," the pride of Soviet shipbuilding, seemed minuscule from the helicopter, exactly as on postcards and emblems.

The helicopter began to descend and the cruiser to grow incredibly quickly. When on the deck of this giant, I saw a gigantic, stirred-up anthill. It seemed that navymen of the air department's rescue party were fussing about chaotically in their enormous area of responsibility. As a matter of fact, each one was functioning in strict conformity with the ship's damage-control bill. Herein lies the strength of the shipboard organization: every navyman has precise knowledge of his maneuver in any situation.

The primary task was to keep the fire from penetrating into the hangars where the aircraft and helicopters were located. Air department personnel (these were not pilots, but those who serve the pilots) were setting various means in motion. Under the direction of defense line commanders senior lieutenants A. Yemel'yantsev and O. Novikov, the navymen were immediately setting up fire hoses and preparing fire extinguishers and foam quenching stations. They were outstripping the fire, which already was a gain in a most difficult struggle.

Meanwhile an An-26 appeared over the cruiser. Crew commander Capt V. Kurilets' first order of business was to order an inflatable life raft dropped for those overboard. A helicopter then continued the operation to rescue them.

The Mi-14 operated by 1st Class Pilot Maj V. Shikhat hovered over a navyman in a life jacket. Dressed in a diving suit, flight medical assistant/rescue specialist WO [praporshchik] A. Barabanov descended to the leaden waves on a line. A special "bucket" rescue device is supposed to pick up a navyman weakened in the cold water. This is done rather easily only if the pilot is able to work with a jeweler's precision.

The waves and wind substantially hindered the work, but still the warrant officer succeeded in the difficult operation on the first pass. Tipping slightly, the helicopter rushed to help others.

But the "fire" was intensifying. At this time the rescue vessel and fire-fighting vessel approached the "Kiev."

Slowing down, they took the ship in watery pincers. The fire monitors were turned on and powerful streams of water fell on the cruiser's deck and superstructures. One lap was enough for the vessels to reliably "extinguish" the fire on the upper deck. This was nothing surprising: the operating capacity,

of the rescue vessel's pumps was such that she was able to bring many tons of water down on the "Kiev."

It is difficult to enumerate all operations which the rescue giant can perform. Now she presented her stern to the cruiser's bow to hook up towing gear. But is it really possible to do this? The "Kiev's" bow rises like a multistory building. Moreover, now and then Capt 2d Rank V. Kurochkin, commander of the rescue vessel, has to "work" the engines to maintain the necessary position. Try to deliver the hauling line of the tow cable here. But then the helicopter hovers over the poop and takes up this operation.

The bow group commanded by Capt-Lt S. Kravchuk, the cruiser's first lieutenant, quickly hooked a rope to the hauling line delivered by the helicopter. The rope slipped over to the rescue vessel, then came the towing lines and after them the steel cable...

It is impossible to take in everything being done by the enormous ship's air department personnel from a single place on the upper deck or even from a helicopter. But the commander sees the work, knows it and constantly directs it. While keeping an eye on the hook-up of the tow, he simultaneously maintains contact with Maj A. Makovetskiy, who commands the helicopter completing the evacuation of "seriously wounded" from the cruiser to the rescue vessel.

The rescue vessel and cruiser are connected by a heavy line, which became a unique "bridge" over which the navymen led the lines of fire hoses, thick power cables and thin telephone cables to the "Kiev." Meanwhile the fire-fighting vessel commanded by Capt 3d Rank A. Vasin hooked up to the boat line at the cruiser's stern. Her crew was preparing to deliver two hose lines for water and the foaming agent solution to the "Kiev."

Water and gas for fire extinguishing were delivered almost simultaneously from the rescue vessel. Now the damage-control party personnel were fully armed. Water was falling on the fire, and the gas--an invisible magician--was "suppressing" the flame silently and effectively. A white foamy trace remained behind the five navymen dressed in heat-resistant suits. They headed right into the scorching heat, clearing a path for those who would "mop up" weakening centers of fire. Officers A. Belenkov and Ye. Kopylov and their subordinates warrant officers [muchmany] A. Luk'yanchuk and Yu. Gekov and Petty Officer 2d Class M. Isayev functioned capably and resolutely.

Reports on eliminating the fire came in to the commander one after the other. This meant that the ship had performed the training mission and that the might of her armament still would serve in a struggle against the "enemy."

The commander of the "Kiev" constantly teaches the crew to know, value and use the ship's wonderful capabilities. This means a very great deal in combat. For example, while it took two bomb hits for the Japanese carrier "Akagi" to sink on 4 June 1942, the Soviet cruiser "Krasnyy Kavkaz" managed to perform the assigned mission during an assault landing at Feodosiya on 29 December 1941 after receiving several holes from 12 shells and 5 mines, which caused 8 centers of fire aboard her. And on the following day she also withstood 14 group and lone attacks by enemy aircraft.

NAVAL FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF SHIP'S FIRST OFFICER EXAMINED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 85 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 3d Rank V. Chupakhin:
"Testing the Future"; under the rubric "Notes of a Military Publicist."]

[Text] A ship's commander is the number-one figure in the Navy. Graphically speaking, the commander is at the center of the most important naval issues; he bears ultimate responsibility for the ship and its crew. There is, however, another person on board along side the commander who is also considerably important: the first officer, i.e., the commander's first deputy. In all probability, he is the one who initiates most of what happens on board a ship. In perspective, he is a future commander himself. Whatever the quality of today's first officers, such will be the quality of tomorrow's commanders. Thus, it is very important that these officers pass the test, inherent in the duties of the first officer, successfully. If an officer is to become a commander one day, he will have to master the important essence of these duties.

While I was once reviewing my numerous entries in my field notebook, I suddenly made an unexpected discovery for myself: There were many detailed entries on the most varied categories of ship officers. The strange thing was that my notes on first officers were brief and laconic. It is, however, the first officer whom one meets upon boarding a ship. You see and sense his presence constantly. His word is "law" in the wardroom; time and again you hear his voice in the ship's quarters and over the public address system. It would seem that the first officer is the most conspicuous person on the ship, but, at the same time, he also seems to be forever in the shadows.

"A riddle?" Capt 3d Rank V. Kozlov smiled. It was he with whom I was sharing my thoughts. "Where is the riddle? It is all very simple. From time immemorial business is conducted in the Navy as follows: the commander deals with the main issues, the first officer with a pile of trifles; the commander bears colossal responsibility, the first officer has endless headaches; the commander is the brains of the ship, the first officer the hands which, more often than not, end up having to do the dirty work."

Kozlov himself is no longer the first officer. The most important event in his naval career took place literally before my eyes; he signed the papers accepting the command to the escort vessel Svirepiy. Kozlov sits thriftily in the commander's chair, which is his by law, steadily sipping steeply-brewed tea. He keeps a strong tone as he gets used to his new position. According to all appearances, however, everything which made him a first officer is still as alive and well in him, as his signature is still wet on his command assumption papers.

"I was a first officer for 5 years," says Kozlov. "I lived 5 years without any days off and only infrequent shoreleave, usually for a few hours at night - from retreat to reveille. The rest of my time was spent on the ship, the ship, the ship. Only he who has been a first officer can understand what it means to be one. You know, I even used this tactic to educate inefficient officers and warrant officers. I did not punish the officer, but I suggested instead that he follow me around everywhere and take note of the things I had to do. After an hour or two, he was simply overwhelmed by the number of duties I had and would begin to excuse himself: 'Let me go, I understand it all now.' Sure, it is somewhat difficult. The first officer, however, has to live this way all the time. Probably it is this result of naval service wisdom that a ship is entrusted only to him who has passed the ordeal of "fire, water and copper pipes" by having been a first officer..."

Kozlov goes on talking while first officers of different ages pass before my thoughtful countenance. Later, I would be lucky to meet with them. Capt 2d Rank V. Korneychuk, a former first officer on the missile cruiser Grozniy, is now a konteradmiral and an assistant to the commander-in-chief of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet; Senior Lieutenant M. Yermilov, a former first officer on the Skoriy, is currently a Capt 2d Rank and an officer on the Navy's Main Staff; Senior Lieutenant A. Kovshar, another former first officer from the Skoriy, is attending the Naval Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko... These are all very different people, but they and many other officers are united by their dedication to the service.

A genuine first officer is always the knight of ship service; he is a self-sacrificing, self-denying person. He simply cannot be otherwise. These qualities are programmed by the first officer's obligations themselves. Article 191 of the Ship's Manual reads: "The frequent leaving of the ship by the ship commander's first officer is incompatible with the required execution of his crucial duties." No one else, not even the commander, has such a severe regulation of his personal freedom. Such is the severe expediency of naval life: under any circumstances, an individual is needed who is on board the ship practically all the time and knows everything which is going on.

This burden is heavy. Unfortunately, not every first officer can handle it.

I recall one meeting in the office of the chief of the political section of a submarine formation with the Northern Fleet. It was my meeting with Senior Lieutenant I. Osiyuk. He was a tall, stately, imposing officer. His eyes, however, were somewhat lack-lustre and had the expression of being lost. It

seemed that Osiyuk was in the political section chief's office for an unpleasant reason: He, the first officer, the pillar of naval order, had seriously violated naval discipline by leaving the ship without permission.

"To be the first officer is more than I can stand," admitted Osiyuk. "I broke away only because I became so very tired."

"But you started out with a wish. At one time, people talked about your dream for a place on the commander's bridge."

"Sure, I once had this wish and dream, but I never thought that being a first officer would turn out to be such a prison. It broke me..."

That is how it happens; for one man, the first officer's duties with all their special tasks and physical and psychological burdens is like a trampoline from which he jumps to the heights of command; for another man, they are an insurmountable barrier, striking against which deprives him of his self-confidence and his foothold in the service. The number of those in the latter category, unfortunately, is large. At one personnel center, they cited a figure to me: every fourth first officer will not become a commander. Of course, this figure is not absolute. It can be different for other units and formations. Additionally, this kind of elimination seems to be logical. But whatever the case, virtually every individual who fails to make it to command because of his failure as a first officer lives through a real drama; his loss, of course, is also the Navy's loss.

Perhaps it would be simpler to just reprimand people like Osiyuk for their weakness and lack of willpower. Perhaps it would be easier to explain first officer failures as personnel oversights: allegedly, it is because the wrong people are appointed that they suffer failure. However, is this really the problem?

I page through the personal data of Capt 3d Rank Yu. Shlyapin, Senior Lieutenant S. Gorbunov and other officers who were relieved of their first officer duties. It turns out that they all were characterized at first as being capable, promising and strong-willed... Of course, mistakes are always made, but the majority of first officers comes up from the best subunit commanders who have clearly demonstrated inborn leadership qualities and dream about higher command positions.

I recall still another meeting, this one with Senior Lieutenant V. Arkhipov, the command first officer of the coastal escort vessel Bodriy. He was performing his duties for the fourth year now. He started his service career magnificently: Barely in the service for 18 months, he became a battery commander; less than a year later, he became the commander of a combat unit. He became the first officer on the Bodriy while he was still a senior lieutenant. "I served with enthusiasm then," Arkhipov recalls, "I've simply torn up my batsman ribbon..."

And afterwards? Arkhipov was recommended to attend classes at the Navy's Senior Specialists School for officers. Surprising everyone, he suddenly

refused to go. A short time later, however, he himself applied for permission to attend the classes, but he had missed the deadlines. He once more is telling people that he has no desire to be a commander.

Whence such vacillation in a person whose career as an officer seemed totally secure and predetermined?

It seemed that Arkhipov himself still had not clearly understood this. We attempted to take a closer look at what happened together.

"Maybe it was that article 191 which is at fault?"

"No," Arkhipov said as he shook his head.

"By itself, the requirement for the first officer 'to sit by eternally' did not faze me."

"Maybe you did not get along with your subordinates."

"It happens, but that problem is surmountable."

"Well, what then?"

"You know," reflects Arkhipov, "I once saw the commander's bridge with a kink of aura around it. But I then got to know it, so to speak, from close up and its aura somehow disappeared..."

Perhaps, it is exactly here where the problem lies. Among the fixed requirements of first officer duty, perhaps the most important thereof is that it is also a kind of test of the future. This duty contains many elements associated with the duties of a commander: The first officer begins his service by passing tests for the right to manage a ship independently; from day one, he learns to work with people and solve all the problems within the scope of all the ship's activities. The main thing is that he lives constantly on the bridge, he sees the example set by his commander with his own eyes. It is extremely important that this example be genuinely appealing and enticing.

It was Capt 3d Rank Kozlov himself who told me:

"That I was entrusted with a ship is primarily the result of my previous commanders' merit, specifically, Capt 3d Rank V. Ukrainyets and Capt 2d Rank L. Shevchenko. They always looked at me as one who together with them was responsible for the crew's combat readiness, the training and military discipline of the personnel, the organization of the ship's services and the overall order on board the ship itself. When I think of the time they spent with me, the things they thought... And not only things having to do with the art of command. More! When our Bdityelniy took into port for repairs, I remember, Shevchenko, even though he did not want to lose his first officer, petitioned that I be transferred to a sailing ship. So that I might grow!"

Unfortunately, we sometimes run into such commanders who literally forget how it was for them when they were first officers. I even heard one once say:

"My first officer gets involved in tactical matters. My idea of a first officer is for him to sit constantly on board the ship and scrape dirt. Once you become a commander, well, that is something else."

But would he have become a commander if he had had such a "tutor?"

This problem has still another side. The desire on the part of the first officers to become commanders also depends largely on how great the prestige of the commander's bridge is overall. Any difficulties can be overcome if an individual knows that the objective he is moving towards is high and honorable. But what does a first officer see sometimes? In the very unit where Arkhipov served so recently, things have taken a turn for the better: 80 percent of the commanders have been penalized by the party, and the number of reprimands from senior commanders is especially high. Similar things are happening elsewhere. We have to talk about the seriousness of the damage being inflicted by the senseless infatuation with the punishment of commanders both on them and on the training of their replacements.

Since we are now talking about prestige issues, we should not omit the prestige of first officer duty. It is "an ordeal of fire, water, and copper pipes." This is how Kozlov referred to it. "Fire" and "water" indeed. But first officers do not seem to be lucky with these copper pipes. The great external unremarkability and the dirty hands-on nature of the first officer's activities sometimes degrades its importance undeservedly in the public's eyes. You rarely see, let us assume, an article on an outstanding first officer on the pages of military press releases. These great toilers are less lavishly encouraged for some reason, than many other categories of officers. In the personnel section of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, people immediately named Capt 3d Rank V. Akulov; he was awarded the order of the Red Star while serving as a first officer. Other names were also named. The list, however, was very quickly exhausted.

However, people do not serve for the sake of awards and newspaper articles. It is wrong to reduce everything to this. Above all, in order to enhance the prestige of the first officer, we need to enhance continually the makeup of his duties. Of course, no one will ever be relieved of the trifles inherent in first officer duties. It is necessary, however, for a first officer to perform his duty more creatively and more purposefully as he aims for the commander's bridge. There is a multitude of opportunities for this. Let us look only at such a frequently occurring issue. Submarines practice so-called first officer firing during which the first officer learns to execute the commander's duties across the board.

Of course, there are a host of specific problems. Their essence, however, is as follows: one must be able to see a future commander through a first officer's deeds and not through his words.

During the history of establishing a national nuclear navy, and this is really history, there was this quite natural occurrence. The first commander of the first Soviet nuclear-powered vessel, Capt 1st Rank L. Osipenko, was preparing his ship for an important and largely pioneering sailing. Suddenly, the captain had an attack of appendicitis. He was taken to the hospital. A report on what had happened was sent to Moscow. Moscow inquired of the unit commander: "Has the first officer ever run the ship?"

"Yes, he has."

First officer, Capt 2d Rank L. Zhiltsov, took the ship out on its first cruise. It was also Zhiltsov, while already a commander, who sailed a nuclear submarine to the North Pole. For this, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In one of my meetings with new Konteradmiral Zhiltsov, after having recalled this occurrence, I asked him what kind of responsibility he was supposed to test for when he was still a rather young officer then, but still given so suddenly the command of a ship which was unique for its time. What pressures did he have to face?

"But my friend," he said, I was the first officer," and with this, I think, he said it all.

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21 May 1985

SPECIAL TROOPS

REVIEW OF DISTRICT PRESS ON MILITARY KOLKHOZ WORK

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Winter on the Farms"]

[Text] The past year was difficult for the sovkhov workers of the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District. However, the farmers, animal breeders, mechanics and farm managers energetically made great efforts to fulfill production plans and meet pledged socialist obligations. Thus, the yield from cereal crops, on the average, was 2 centners per hectare. This means that the district's military sovkhoves added several thousand more tons of grain to the bins. For the first time, an extremely large number of potatoes was harvested; more than 10,000 tons were collected on the military sovkhoves.

The district newspaper KRASNOYE ZNAMYA warned already in October that it was wrong to celebrate over what had already been accomplished. It is necessary to create the conditions for the successful wintering of cattle, continue the filling of the bins, increase hay and straw silage, and stock edible roots supplies, especially in those military sovkhoves where the fields had suffered from drought. The newspaper reported about the need to repair animal husbandry structures in a timely manner and organize the workload of all mechanisms.

The warning was timely, but, unfortunately, people did not listen to it everywhere. In the Kadamovskiy military sovkhov, as the newspaper reported, transporters became inoperational, electricity service was curtailed. Milking had to be done by hand. This resulted in drastically reduced milk yields, even though there had been a reliable fodder base. Although the sovkhov's leading milkers V. Zolotareva, I. Groo and V. Bundziniyeks carry out their own duties, a great deal of effort is required from the other farm workers for successful work this winter, which, as is well-known, has turned out to be severe.

Unexpected work stoppages occurred on the home farm of the military construction detachment where Senior Warrant Office N. Shesternin serves. Feed for this farm which produces swine was delivered late. As a result, it was difficult to forecast the number of young swine on the way. There were cases of a decline in young cattle stock as well. The paper once again

sounded the alarm. It spoke out against indifference and self-complacency; these attitudes can irreparably hurt the cause.

KRASNOYE ZNAMYA not only revealed the shortcomings in the operations of military sovkhozes and home farms, but also generalized about the experiences of the foremost workers. Warrant Officer A. Zgonyayko told in detail about the substantial output of his unit's home farm. As a result, the soldiers have good things to eat at their meals in addition to their regular fare. The soldiers and sergeants receive a glass of milk daily at breakfast. Last year many kilograms of meat were produced for every service member who eats in the military mess hall.

It would be good for our newspapers to analyze more frequently the specific production operations of military sovkhozes and units' home farms, and specifically tell us how winter passes on the farms. In our opinion, a journalistic raid on the farms would be useful. In a nutshell, the press is summoned to assist in the execution of the Food Program, something which is a genuine cause for all the people.

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MILITARY-SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION DURING WW II

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 85 pp 2-3

[Article by Academician A. Fokin, Lenin Prize Laureate: "Scientists for the Front"]

[Text] "These days, when the earth is being drenched in more and more flows of human blood through the fault of fascist rulers, the USSR Academy of Sciences appeals to all world scientists and to all friends of science and progress with the call to rally all forces to protect human culture against Hitler's barbarians.

"Can any one of us workers of science look calmly on the fact that the boot of the fascist soldier threatens to crush out the bright light of humanity throughout the world--the freedom of human thought and the right of peoples to develop their own cultures independently? Can just one country consider itself safe until Hitlerism, the center of oppressive wars, is defeated?

"Fascism is the bitterest enemy of culture and science. . . .

"Everyone who cherishes the cultural heritage of the millennia and for whom the high ideals of science and humanism are sacred must bend every effort to see that the insane and dangerous enemy is destroyed."

These lines are from an appeal "To the Scientists of All Countries," which was heard in the first days of the war. An extraordinary expanded session of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium was held on 23 June 1941 with the participation of the country's most prominent scientists. It was attended by I. Bardin, A. Baykov, S. Vavilov, B. Vedeneyev, A. Ioffe, P. Kapitsa, M. Keldysh, V. Komarov, G. Krzhizhanovskiy, O. Shmidt and others. The resolutions adopted at this session in response to the party's appeal marked the beginning of a reorganization of all work of the country's scientific establishments onto a wartime footing. From that moment we began to live in a different dimension and to assess in a different way our acts, our duty and our potential capabilities. The motto "Everything for the front, everything for victory" determined the life of the country's scientists in the full sense of the word.

Fascism turned German science into an enormous laboratory of death and concentrated all efforts by scientists, designers and engineers on creation of a hitherto unprecedented military machine for the destruction of states and peoples. Then this machine was set in motion against the Soviet Union.

"Death itself," wrote Leonid Leonov, "moved along the highways in cans, boxes, tubes and tanks--quality German death tested in state laboratories; liquid, solid and gaseous death; the death that roamed our lands in the mobile gas chambers disguised as staff buses. In those days everything which had languished for centuries in the cellars of German universities was rushing at us."

Scientists of the Land of Soviets were faced with a most difficult and responsible task--to help the party and people assure a most rapid transition of our entire industry onto a wartime footing, to set the economic potential in motion, and to throw at the hated enemy the incalculable forces of technology, the country's boundless resources, and all the might of research and design imagination.

The war demanded not only a unification of efforts of the scientists of many specialties, but also precise coordination of actions by scientific establishments. A solution to the problem was seen in the establishment of special commissions. They included very prominent specialists in their field of knowledge and representatives of various organizations of the Academy of Sciences. Sent by the party, they had a close contact with governmental establishments and industrial and defense people's commissariats.

USSR Academy of Sciences President Academician V. Komarov headed up the commission for mobilization of resources of the Urals and Western Siberia, and Academician Ye. Chudakov headed the commission on resources of the Povolzhye and Prikamye. A commission under the Geological and Geographical Sciences Department chaired by Academician A. Fersman was engaged in geological and geographical support. The military medical commission was headed up by USSR Academy of Sciences Vice President Academician L. Orbeli. Also organized were commissions on scientific-technical and naval matters (the chairman was Academician A. Ioffe) and on air matters (directed by Academician N. Bruyevich).

It now can be said with full assurance that this form of organization of scientific research work was optimum under the wartime conditions. The idea of the closest tie of science and practical work was most fully embodied in it. It gave an opportunity not only to carry out large-scale studies involving the economic development of entire regions of the country, but also to fulfill the specific assignments of a purely practical nature of the party Central Committee and GKO [State Defense Committee], which was no less important.

The first work plan of the USSR Academy of Sciences under wartime conditions was drawn up by September 1941. All academic institutes and laboratories revised the subject matter of scientific research so as to complete those of defense importance and which might have an effect in the immediate future in the shortest possible time.

In order to establish close contact with military organizations, the Academy invited representatives of the Supreme Command to visit scientific establishments for familiarization with defense projects being conducted in laboratories and science centers. The work of the Academy of Sciences focused chiefly on three directions. First of all, it was necessary to improve military equipment and develop new means of fighting the enemy; secondly, it was necessary to give scientific assistance to industry in organizing and expanding military production; and thirdly, it was necessary to locate and use new raw materials of the country and provide for replacing scarce materials with local raw materials.

It is impossible to transmit that working intensity and that selflessness and genuine heroism with which scientists labored during the war years. Each one had a clear picture of all the difficulty of the situation at hand. Many volunteered for the Soviet Army and the people's militia and went to the front in the first days of the war. The situation demanded the rebasing of scientific establishments and higher educational institutions of the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic, a number of oblasts of the Russian Federation, Moscow and Leningrad to the deep rear. The USSR Academy of Sciences alone was forced to evacuate 35 of its establishments. But the tasks had to be accomplished, and without delay. "Not once in my life have I seen such a unification of science and labor, the powerful wave of labor enthusiasm, and the creative enthusiasm, as now," wrote Academician V. Steklov in those years.

I had occasion to witness how a group of coworkers didn't leave the laboratory for many days and nights. They slept right there on the tables, were half-starving, and still completed an enormous amount of work in these several weeks which would have taken years in peacetime. I saw scientists working selflessly with instruments in the open air at 40 degrees below zero; their hands stuck to the cold metal, skin would be torn off and still not one of the coworkers withdrew or stopped work until the necessary results were obtained. The front demanded this.

It is difficult to enumerate everything done by Soviet scientists during the Great Patriotic War. For example, the enemy rested great hopes on influence mines--magnetic and acoustic--which would explode if a ship passed near them. The problem arose of mastering the methods of countering these mines. It was successfully solved by academicians A. Aleksandrov and I. Kurchatov.

Academician S. Khristianovich found a theoretical solution to the principles of change in the aerodynamic characteristics of an aircraft's wing in the transition to high-speed flight. A group of scientists headed by M. Keldysh developed a mathematical theory of flutter. Our air science thus provided reliable protection for aircraft against the appearance of vibrations, and during the war Soviet aviation had no instances where aircraft broke up because of an imprecise determination of wing strength.

Scientists of Leningrad headed by Academician A. Ioffe demonstrated an example of staunchness and courage in the war years. Despite the fact that they had an opportunity to fly out of the besieged city on any day, they remained there and resolved matters very important for defense under very difficult conditions.

For example, USSR AN [Academy of Sciences] Corresponding Member N. Belyayev was a consultant for specialists building defensive works and he participated in the construction of runways. On an assignment from the Leningrad party gorkom, a group of associates of the Physical Technical Institute developed a very effective incendiary mixture and new antitank blasting explosives.

Scientists of the city on the Neva participated in building the Road of Life laid over the ice of Lake Ladoga. Automatic instruments developed by N. Reyman which were named "deflectographs" helped keep watch on ice deformations as heavily laden vehicles moved across it.

Each time we look into the past in recalling the war years we are struck by how much Soviet scientists, designers, engineers and workers succeeded in doing. Foreign historians later would call this the "Russian miracle." But this was no miracle; it was a natural pattern prepared by our entire social system, by our way of life and by concern shown by the Party of Communists. An atmosphere of enthusiasm, innovation, and burning creativeness was established in our country in the years of Soviet power. In a very short time we were able to accumulate unprecedented intellectual potential and a most enormous stockpile of scientific studies. All this, multiplied by the highest patriotism of Soviet citizens and their unshakable faith in victory, permitted developing equipment and armament in short periods of time which surpassed in their capabilities similar models in the inventory of Hitler's hordes.

Suffice it to recall the Soviet T-34, KV and IS tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces developed by Soviet designers M. Koshkin, Zh. Kotin, A. Morozov, N. Dukhov, N. Astrov, F. Petrov and others. And our rocket launchers, the famed guards "Katyusha's," developed on the basis of results of studies by Soviet scientists and created by a group of talented engineers. The 76-mm gun (ZIS-3), designed under the direction of Doctor of Technical Sciences V. Grabin, had excellent tactical and technical characteristics and at the same time a simplicity of component design and exceptional technological qualities. This gun was placed on an assembly line for the first time in world practice. The superb fighters of A. Yakovlev and S. Lavochin, the ground attack aircraft of S. Il'yushin and the bombers of A. Tupolev and V. Petlyakov were developed on the basis of aviation science.

The scientists' close tie with organizations in whose interests studies were being performed--with the design bureaus, plants, shops, arsenals and military units--was typical of the scientists' work in that period. The scientists often would give technical assistance in the very process of research which they were performing right where it was to be adopted.

For example, in the first war years an acute problem arose in the production of tank and aircraft engines. The scientists of two USSR Academy of Sciences institutes--metallurgy and mechanical engineering--joined in a search for new material. This group was headed by USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member A. Bochvara. Scientific workers labored together with plant specialists.

The work concluded successfully in 1943 with the development of a new alloy--zinc silumin, which had good casting properties, was considerably simpler to

produce, required no hardening, permitted saving on some 20 percent of scarce aluminum and reduced the weight of parts. Simplification of the heat treatment of engine housings made of this material permitted up to a 50 percent saving in electrical power.

The adoption in plant practice of the method of automatic welding with liquid additives developed by Academician V. Nikitin permitted improving the production of artillery shells. This method proved to be 50 times more efficient than the manual method, required 30 percent less scarce copper and required 50 percent less electricity. In addition, it completely eliminated the labor-intensive processes of casting, cold working, and mounting of driving bands.

The development of a method of automatic electric hidden-arc welding under the direction of Academician Ye. Paton was a great achievement of Soviet scientists and engineers in the field of machine building technology in the war years. It was used successfully for manufacturing tank hulls, aerial bombs and artillery armament.

It must be said that it was not just the representatives of technical and applied sciences, but also of basic sciences who resolved specific tasks of defense importance. Studies conducted under the direction of Professor I. Kitaygorodskiy permitted developing aircraft bullet-resistant glass. Using his work in the field of probability theory, Academician A. Kolmogorov provided a definition of the optimum dispersion of artillery shells and USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member N. Chetayev solved a difficult problem of determining the optimum angle of rifling in gun tubes, which permitted ensuring grouping capability and stability of shells in flight.

Everyone worked for defense. Chemists perfected technological processes for obtaining high-octane gasolines and lubricants and they derived formulas for manufacturing explosives and powders. Geologists discovered new deposits of iron, copper and manganese ores. Geographers, geodesists and topographers carried out operational assignments of the General Staff in compiling geological and geographic maps, references, descriptions of the territories of fronts and calendars of seasonal phenomena...

Scientists representing the social sciences made a substantial contribution to our common victory. The great Lenin's immortal ideas about defense of the socialist homeland, about the party's leading role in ensuring victory in war, and about the economic and moral-political strength of the rear as one of the deciding factors for defeating the enemy became the basis of works which contributed to the shaping of a social awareness and a Marxist-Leninist outlook and instilled a sense of national pride and patriotism and an unshakable will to win in Soviet servicemen and rear toilers.

In summing up the overall results of work by the USSR Academy of Sciences in the Great Patriotic War and describing its contribution to defense and to the development of the country's national economy, it must be noted that it coped successfully with those tasks which war set before science, and it demonstrated its maturity and capability to resolve the most difficult problems imaginatively. "By their selfless labor, workers, kolkhoz members, scientists, engineers and designers won an unprecedented battle for metal and

bread, for fuel and raw materials, and for creating powerful Soviet weapons," stated the CPSU Central Committee Decree "Fortieth Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."

The war years did not hold up the progressive movement of Soviet science. The unceasing theoretical studies, continued development of basic directions in the development of science, and preservation of science cadres attest to the fact that despite the stern ordeals that fell to the lot of the Soviet people, the Communist Party constantly displayed concern for the future of science. This then became one of the factors in our further remarkable achievements in the field of atomic power engineering, cosmonautics, organic chemistry, electronics and other fields of knowledge.

6904

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MILITARY HISTORY

WARTIME LEADER SHCHERBAKOV COMMEMORATED

PM0211150 [Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 March 1985 first edition devotes virtually all of page 4 to a feature, published under the rubric "makers of victory. From private to marshal" and the headline "Commisar Shcherbakov," consisting of a 5,000-word memoir by Lieutenant General N. Pupyshev, wartime chief of the cadres directorate of the worker-peasant Red Army main political directorate, as told to G. Solonitsyn, dealing with the wartime career of Aleksandr Sergeyevich Shcherbakov, who was appointed chief of the worker-peasant Red Army main political directorate in addition to being candidate member of the party Central Committee Politburo, first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom and Obkom, and chief of the Sovinform Bureau.

Pupyshev reviews Shcherbakov's appointment and work as chief of the political directorate, noting that he provided "the firm and solicitous hand and wise counsel of a prestigious leader in a difficult period when in the south of the country the enemy had again started to press our forces on a broad front; recalls his association with "well known party figures and Central Committee members" "A. A. Andreyev, A. G. Zverov, D. Z. Manuilskiy, K. I. Nikolayeva, V. P. Potemkin, N. M. Shvernik, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, and others"; and describes Shcherbakov's efforts to recruit party members in the army and his traits when dealing with people.

Alluding to Shcherbakov's work in the literary sphere, Pupyshev recalls:

"Toward the end of 1943 the main political directorate chief asked me, smiling slyly: "'Have you read Stepanov's book "Port Arthur"?"

"'No, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, I haven't read it; I haven't even heard of it.'

"He laughed. I thought, mistakenly, that he was laughing at my ignorance, but things turned out to be quite different.

"'This book,' Aleksandr Sergeyevich said, 'was tracked down by Comrade Stalin. It was published in KRASNODAR in a very small print run, and it was found with difficulty only in the Lenin library. A few days ago Comrade Stalin showed me the novel and asked whether I had read it. I admitted that, although I am quite an Avid reader, I had somehow missed this work. So he gave it to me to read.'

"He remained silent for a while, and then added: "'Comrade Stalin considers it necessary that some more work be done on the novel "Port Arthur" and that it then be published in a large print run. We have been instructed to tackle this matter. The author must be found as soon as possible. Comrade Stalin is looking far ahead.'

"The reissue of this book in a large print run at the turning point of the war against the fascists was already a matter of concern for the supreme commander in terms of the psychological preparation of the army and the country as a whole for the inevitable clash with Japanese militarism...."

In the final section of the feature, subheaded "The Communist's Duty," Pupyshv sums up Shcherbakov's life, traces the history of his family, and concludes: "A. S. Shcherbakov fought (there is no other suitable word) until the very last day of the war. Literally until the very day of victory. On 8 May 1945 A. S. Shcherbakov inspected Muscovites' readiness for the celebrations and managed to enjoy the end of the war together with the whole people; but 2 days later--on 10 May 1945--his heart stopped beating. He had done everything within his power for victory, and much more in addition."

A 200-word "biographical facts" item at the foot of the page mentions that "at A. A. Zhdanov's recommendation [Shcherbakov] was sent to study at the 'Red Professors Institute' in 1930."

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